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Introduction: 
Once its representatives enter the halls of government, the 
democratic movement of South African faces the challenge of 
dismantling the authoritarian apartheid machinery that-,- ever 
~ l? ,ti.</\ ~ 
~ forcep the African majority to work as low cost 
labor reserve to enrich the minority. This will require the 
democratic movement, all working on aspects of South African rural 
development, took part in a workshop sponsored by the Land and 
Agricultural Policy Centre in the Economics Department of the 
University of Witswatersrand. T}wl:Ee,.,. For a week, they worked 
., ' :, ·- 0, y-,_ J 0 
together to ~in the task of master~ a theory and rnethodolo~y 
~f\t•,v _ _/ ,"),~j/•'-c<'. f"ur?'I' 
for using l~w to create·~ institutions required to empewer;S0uth 
pvvg,/..1 c,,:f- f"<'- //-•· , 
Africa's peo:t rural maje:r;i:ty ta participate effectiYely -in 
aohieving full employment afld an impz:eved quality of life. 
The workshop centered o~ enJblinJ t_he p~r~icipa;1ts to✓ lea1:,~ _,, 
/ {.," 'I!.> 5'!J '-" 5" ; o> -. ·--' _";'u,~ "s, --/, _t·'' ,_, -- //hcf"'r - j ( 
the process of transformin_g policy into law, by 1. a,o-klirtg . .t.he task of 
draftin~'ti{~;, l~1,._,~:~.t.~~ure two centrai institutions that shape 
the lives of rural South Africans: 1) for improving the working and 
living conditions of the millions of farm workers on South Africa's 
60,000 commercial farms; and 2) to establish an Extension Agency to 
/ 
support the efforts of South Africa's rural unemployed to obtain 
productive employment and raise their living standards. 
---,Dra"1li™j on tbe;j r expe1.ience iu China:>, the /0 I "1 -h ,,.; (,• a/ workshop 
facilitators observed that the ~reposed drafti:ng prQSOEH!' resembled 
that of learning to ride a bicycle. A 'consultant' could lecture 
for a week about how to ride a bicycle, but in the end the hearers, 
no matter how willing, could still not ride it. The consultant 
would only have to spend a half hour showing them how to ride, and 
give them each a bicycle to ensure that in a few hours all would be 
able to learn for themselves. Using the second approach, the 
facilitators explained to the workshop participants the basic 
principles of the theory and methodology of drafting legi:,.:,ttion to 
put their \:/~cies into law. Then the participants, ~eing the 
facilitator~ly as resour~~ ~ent the remaiode~ ef =the ueek 
~the methodology to think through the underlying premises of 
legislative programmes relating to critical aspects of South 
African rural development, and beginning to draft legislation in 
two of the priority legislation areas they identified. 
This report summarizes the results of their work. It 
1) outlines the theory and methodology introduced at the 
workshop; 
2) defines those the workshop participants included in their 
1 The faci itators, BtJP.~t"ld~ 1,seidman, currently serve as 
the Chief Technic 1 Advisors fo a five year project to draft 22 
priority economic ws designe to facilitate China's Reforms and 
Open Policy; to o casion to enable some 200 Chinese 
drafters to learn the eory and methodology of legislative 
drafting; and, in parti lar, ogive some 40 Chinese a sufficient 
in-depth knowledge theory d methodology to become the 
facilitators for ext ding the learn g process to the thousands of 
drafters required t generate an adequate legal framework for a 
fourth of the world's population. 
concept of the 'rural poor'; 
3) indicates the scope of the three legislative programmes 
necessary to meet the rural poor majority's basic needs; 
4) presents the elements of their initially-proposed draft 
bills, and their outlines of the accompanying memoranda of law 
required to explain why they proposed those elements; and 
5) presents their proposals for continuing and expanding a 
democratic participatory process of completing the drafting of 
these bills and-tackling the larger essential legislative 
programmes. 
I I . A theory and methodology for a democratic, participatory 
process of transforming policy into draft legislation: 
Operating through law, the state, warts and all, serves as the 
organized polity's primary instrument for the conscious social 
change that development requires. The legal order constitutes the 
operative form of state policy. No matter how much they may desire 
social change, governments can only implement policy through laws 
directed at influencing the behavior of people. If state policy 
aims to increase mineral extraction, for example, the government 
cannot decree that ore deposits uncover themselves. It can only 
try to induce people to invest in finding and digging them out. In 
this sense, government has no choice but to employ the legal order 
instrumentally, using it to change the behaviors of citizens and 
state officials. 
Social policies have no effective content until expressed as 
law. Yet few development theorists or practitioners have studied 
the process of moving from general policy prescriptions to the more 
detailed level required for formulating statutes or regulations. 
That process requires knowledge of the law's limits. 
The legal order does not constitute a free good in unlimited 
supply. Policy-makers cannot simply determine their policy goals, 
assuming that technicians will always find the appropriate legal 
means to attain them. Unless policy-makers honor the limits of 
law, their policies must fail (Pound, 1917) . The legal order 
therefore imposes its own constraints upon the policies that a 
state can implement. As Malinowski (1941:1237) wrote long ago, 
Questions about the limits of legislative action, about its 
ability to create new types of man and types of culture are as 
practically cogent as they are theoretically illuminating. 
A. INSTITUTIONS AS REPETITIVE PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR. 
All laws address social problems. By definition, a social 
problem consists of repetitive behaviors that somebody 
characterizes as undesirable; not only behaviors commonly so 
~~ denoted)(prostitution, wife abuse, child marriages), but also those 
commonly called 'economic' (inflation, low productivity, blocked 
technology transfers) or 'political' (corruption, the excessive use 
of power by local political bosses) 
undesirable repetitive behaviors. 
All these consist of 
Social problems occur neither by accident, nor because of 
transcendental forces, whether supernatural or the market's 
'invisible hand.' They arise because of the social behavior of 
determinate sets of actor$: State officials who determine 
government policy; mine, factory and plantation owners and managers 
who decide whether and what to produce and whom to employ; bankers 
who determine to whom and how much money to lend; workers who 
choose to work for the wages off,ered; peasants who decide to plant 
sorghum for the family or cotton for sale. Norms, formal or 
informal, invariably purport to prescribe the behavior of these 
various sets of social actors. Each set therefore consists of what 
sociologists call 'role occupants,' that is, the addressees of 
norms. 'Institutions' likewise comprise the repetitive patterns of 
social behavior by particular sets of role occupants (Homans 1967). 
In South Africa, as elsewhere, poverty and powerlessness 
persisted because of the myriad sets of social behaviors that 
comprised institutions. To overcome that poverty and powerlessness 
meant changing those institutions. That necessarily meant changing 
the legal order. 
B. THE FUNCTION OF THE LEGAL ORDER IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS. 
Societies can purposefully change repetitive behaviors --
institutions -- only by altering the norms that define them; "rules 
are the midwives of organization" (Wunsch and Owolu 1990a:10). In 
the 20th century societies consciously changed institutions 
primarily by using state power to alter the legal order. Roscoe 
Pound (1942) called that "social engineering through law." 
The legal order constitutes a specialized normative system 
that defines specific rules or norms, and an associated sanctioning 
system that enforces them. In that normative system the state 
plays the leading role (Lowi, 19AA). The state comprises, not only 
the rules of law, but also the behaviors of all the officials who 
formulate and implement them: Bureaucrats, 
police, soldiers, sailors, teachers, jailers 
elected officials, 
and sheriffs and 
agricultural extension officers, and a horde of others (March and 
Olsen 1989:17). In their roles as officials, they act within public 
institutions such as courts, legislatures, ministries, public 
corporations, departments, the uniformed forces, state schools and 
universities, all the state's implementing agencies (cf. Jessop 
1982:222). These officials' behaviors comprise the exercise of 
state power. 
One cannot intelligently discuss the institutions that shape 
a nation's reality -- property, international trade, corporations, 
banks and the money supply, and so forth -- without discussing the 
relevant laws: Property law, the law of international trade, 
corporation law, banking law and the laws affecting the granting of 
credit and the creation of paper money. 2 Conversely, one cannot 
make sense out of these laws without discussing the nature and role 
of the relevant institutions -- that is, the patterns of relevant 
role occupants' social behavior. 
C. METHODOLOGY, PERSPECTIVES, CATEGORIES 
If everyone agreed on values, the problems of drafting 
legislation for development would become easy. In South Africa, 
plainly no such agreement exists, as evidenced by the polarized 
socio-economic structure imposed by apartheid. Furthermore, most 
people reject the notion that if a Great Leader decides on the law, 
that alone makes it valid. Instead, experience has taught that a 
valid decision must prove 'rational', that is, one that "can be 
explained and defended by arguments acceptable to a reasonable 
audience" (Kronman 1990:1045; see Majone 1989:34; White 1990:50). 
To persuade others of the validity of their decisions, policy-
makers must convince them they followed a rational set of decision-
making rules: A "logically ordered sequence of questions that 
policy makers can ask, prior to making a decision, that will 
2 Giving central importance to structural-legal 
relationships in state-group ties, corporatist theorists come close 
to this perception. 
'd · t' f t' g'' {Elmore 1982:"'"'). prov1. e prescr1.p ions or ac 1.n In South 
Africa, too, the democratic movement needs a theory to guide the 
policy-oriented research that must undergird rational law-making. 
An adequate theory of law and development must incorporate a 
methodology, a perspective {or 'grand theory'), and explanatory 
categories. Its methodology provides a research agenda for 
deciding what policies and what laws to propose; that agenda 
provides preliminary criteria for relevance. Its perspective guides 
the discretionary choices researchers make in pursuing that agenda; 
that, too, provides criteria for determining what counts, and what 
does not. Its explanatory categories direct them to investigate 
specified sets of data, implicitly declaring other matters 
irrelevant. Thus theory bounds law-makers' rationality; without 
bounded rationality they become overwhelmed by the world {Simon 
1982). 
As a framework for drafting legislation, the May workshop 
focussed primarily on methodology, and categories. 3 
A. METHODOLOGY 
Conventional development decision-making implicitly or 
explicitly typically incorporates an ends-means methodology: 
"[I]n order to decide rationally, policy-makers must specify 
their objectives; lay out the alternatives by which the 
objectives may be accomplished; evaluate the consequences of 
each alternative; and choose the action that maximizes net 
benefits" {Majone 1989:12 4 ; cf. Lindblom 1963). 
3 Space does not permit a review, far less a critique, of the 
broad range of often-conflicting grand theories that inevitably 
influence researchers' and practitioners' research and proposals. 
4 Majone uses the term "decisionism" for what we here call 
"ends-means" {see also Lindblom 19"'"'). 
That agenda contradicts three important criteria for an 
adequate development theory: By falsely separating facts and 
values, it denies the possibility of deciding what policies to 
adopt based on experience; it does not require evaluation of the 
consequences; and it fosters authoritarianism. 
In contrast, the problem-solving policy-making research 
agenda, 5 ~ the May workshop, meets all four criteria for 
an adequate methodology for formulating legislation. Inherently 
grounded in evidence it meets the central criterion for good 
theory, the employment of reason informed by experience. It 
requires reference to evidence at each of its four steps: 
1 . Identifying the problem. ~olicy-oriented researchers musti 
first· decide on what problem to focus attention and then 
analyze available data to figure out its full nature and 
scope. Since social problems consist of dysfunctional 
behaviors, the state and law can only address social problems 
by trying to change those time- and place-specific behaviors. 
For policy purposes, therefore, researchers must specify whose 
and what behaviors constitute the social problem under review. 
2 . Formulating and testing tentative explanations 
(explanatory hypotheses) . Having identified the specific 
features of the problematic social behavior, policy 
researchers must gather evidence to test the explanatory 
hypotheses a theory initally suggests. If those hypotheses 
coincide with the available evidence, they provide a rational 
basis for formulating legislative proposals addressed to the 
causes they specify. 
Explanatory hypotheses lie at the very core of problem-
solving. Policy researchers may generate them from a variety 
\J ). /! : ,:,- .. _ (; '.1.1 b,:,.;, ' ~ _<- / -(.,.J . i- ' ;: / ,; I ~: ,, -✓- -
5 As distinguished from ~gmat.-ie---ine-t-ement-a-1--i-st ~ah 
~-6-:208) described (and critici~: A methodolog thaty 
and 
are 
aim 
and 
takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social 
power relationships and the institutions into which they 
organized, as the given framework for action. The general 
of problem-solving is to make these relationships 
institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively 
particular sources of trouble. 
with 
,, 
of sources: by examining hypotheses apparently warranted by 
experience in other times and places; by teasing them of 
grand theory; by searching the scholarly literature; by 
reviewing their own list of explanatory categories; or simply 
by cutting them out of whole cloth. These hypotheses consist 
of tentative causal propositions at an appropriate level of 
abstraction that, together, comprise possible explanations for 
concrete, time- and place-specific problematic behaviors. 
They properly serve to focus the researchers' scarce resources 
on gathering the evidence that might falsify them, and 
therefore away from irrelevant data. 
In this sense, an explanatory hypothesis functions as a map, 
telling researchers what evidence to look for. Just as 
general principles of map-making do little to help travellers 
grope their way around a given rural area, so general theory 
remains on too high a level of abstraction to guide 
researchers in their search for the facts required to help 
explain -- and hence solve -- social problems in particular 
circumstances. On the other hand, a map of the area on a one-
to-one scale that covered all its details would have to be as 
large as the area itself -- and hence useless. A map maker 
takes the middle way, selecting particular features of the 
area useful for specific users: To help travellers find their 
way around, some on roads, some on trains; to help recreation 
planners to discover where open spaces seem desirable; to 
acquaint zoners with prevailing occupancy patterns; to 
identify hilly areas and sources of water. In the same way, 
explanatory hypotheses purporting to explain how law relates 
to specific social problems serve as maps to guide 
researchers' investigations. They exclude irrelevant data and 
single out evidence likely relevant to their problem. 
3. Proposal for solution. Unlike most academic research, 
problem-solving, policy- or law-oriented research cannot stop 
with testing explanations. To change problematic behavior 
requires reformulating policy expressed in new rules 
legislation, ministerial or departmental regulations, or, in 
nop-state institutions, new internal rules of conduct. These 
rules must, of course, try to solve the social problem in the 
most socially cost-effective way. Generating the operative 
form of a policy proposal -- a specific set of laws or 
regulations therefore calls for three steps: a) 
Critically reviewing alternative possible measures that follow 
logically from warranted explanations; b) finding the 
alternatives that will most likely effectively resolve the 
problem; and c) determining which seems most cost-effective. 
d. Implementing and monitoring the proposed solution. 
4. The problem-solving methodology requires implemention of 
the specific legal measures adopted, and monitoring the 
consequences. The problem-solving methodology explicitly 
insists on incorporating feedback into the law-making process. 
The results almost never turn out as expected for three 
reasons: First, the explanatory hypothesis may not correctly 
identify all possible causal factors; second, the 
implementation process may prove inadequate; and, third, as 
the real world conditions inevitably always change, 
institutions that initially worked well may in time block more 
appropriate new patterns of social behavior. Since policies 
implemented through law never achieve precisely the results 
anticipated, they present new difficulties that require 
repetition of the problem-solving agenda's four steps. 
Development is not a static goal, but a process of constantly 
explaining and solving new problems. 
B. CATEGORIES 
Explanatory categories constitute a second component of any 
theory. Alone, those categories do not explain anything; at best, 
in conjunction with the researcher's perspective (grand theory), 
they spark off educated guesses (explanatory hypotheses) as to 
specific causal factors. These explanatory hypotheses then direct 
researchers' attention to the data they must find to falsify them. 
In that way, the categories researchers use turn their attention to 
causal factors likely to prove relevant (Popper 1972:46; Homans 
1967; Winch 1958: 15 6 ) • 
Legal realists generally agree on the necessity of explaining 
how the state and the legal order influence social behavior. They 
remain sharply at odds, however, over what explanatory categories 
to consider. This section first considers the behavioral model on 
which they generally agree. It then suggests additional categories 
that seem to encompass all the other potential factors likely to 
influence social actors' behavior when confronted by law. 
1. A general model of law and social behavior. A simple 
model (Fig. 3) captures the legal realists' agreement on the broad 
6 Because words denote concepts, and "concepts" and 
"categories" have the same referent, what we denote as "categories" 
we might equally denote as a "vocabulary". 
categories likely to explain any role-occupant's behavior. It 
builds on Hans Kelsen's model (Fig. 2) : 7 Lawmakers issue norms 
that either command addressees to obey (e.g., tort or criminal 
law), or offer them opportunities (e.g., contract and corporation 
law); and simultaneously, direct agencies (administrators, courts, 
police) to implement them (Bentham, 1970:144; Kelsen 1961:58-64; 
Austin, 1834:lectures I,V). 
[Fig. 2 about here]. 
The law's addressees, or role occupants, may constitute every 
member of society ("Thou shalt not commit murder"); a defined class 
of non-officials ( "No director of a corporation may use insider 
knowledge for private benefit"); or an official ("The Minister 
shall promulgate fair and reasonable rules for the generation and 
distribution of electricity"). 
Fig. 3 positions this ideal-type model of law's or norms' 
influence in the real-world reality of flesh-and-blood actors 
choosing how to behave in a world over which they have at most 
limited control. 
Fig. 3 about here 
People act by choosing among alternatives (Barth 19""). 
Acting in the face of a rule of law, role occupants choose not only 
7 In effect, adopted by the dominant 19th Century school of 
jurisprudence, classical analytical positivism. 
in light of the rule (the relevant legal order), but among all the 
constraints and resources of their milieus. These include three 
sets of factors: (a) the rule itself; (b) the expected behaviors 
of law-implementing agencies; and (c) the non-legal constraints and 
resources of the role-occupants' milieus. In addition, the milieus 
of official in the relevant implementing agencies also include 
feedback from the direct addressees of the rule (the primary 'role 
occupants') . To generate middle-level hypotheses to explain 
behavior in the face of a rule (and thus to guide the all-important 
empirical research required to change it appropriately), the model 
teaches policy-makers to consider all these categories. The legal 
realists failed to agree on what causal factors to include in the 
non-legal constraints and resources. 
2. The ROCCIPI research agenda. The sociological 
jurisprudents tried to reduce the non-legal factors' influence on 
a role occupant to a single one: "Values and attitudes" (Friedman 
1969). Law and Economics proposed another monocausal explanation: 
Material incentives (Posner 1986). Recognizing the importance of 
these two factors, the generation of fruitful middle-level 
propositions to explain role-occupants' behavior in the face the 
law requires more inclusive categories (Seidman, R. B. 1978b; cf. 
Allott 1980:236ff.; Lloyd-Bostock 1979; Jones 1968; Evan 1965:285): 
The Rules. The explanation for a rule of law's failure to 
induce desired behavior may. lie in the rule's inadequate 
formulation. Does its wording specify precisely the desired 
behavior? Or does it provide only vague guidelines that leave too 
much to the role-occupants' discretion thus inviting goal 
substitution? 8 Does the law specify adequate implementation 
procedures and provide sufficient resources for enforcement? Does 
it provide adequate monitoring of the implementation process? 
In addition to particular rules that directly address the 
behavior at issue, researchers must consider the entire system of 
laws and implementing agencies that may affect role occupants' 
behaviours. For example, water polluters act not only in light of 
the rules conventionally labelled "water pollution law", or 
'environmental law', but also property law, contract law, water 
law, tax law, constitutional law, and many others. Every legal 
system includes the proposition that what the law does not forbid, 
it permits. Unless a law expressly forbids landowners from 
polluting streams that run through their property, they have a 
legal right to pollute it. Moreover, the legal order includes not 
only the rules, but implementing agencies. Polluters will take 
into. account not the sanctions 'in the books' , but those they 
expect that the implementing agencies will actually impose. 
b. The Requirements of Choice. Only when circumstances force 
role-occupants to choose do they consciously decide whether or not 
to obey a law. As an extreme example, to say that a babe in arms 
'obeys' the law against driving a car below the legal speed-limit 
misuses the word 'obeys' . Role-occupants consciously choose 
whether to obey a law only when three additional categories of 
factors coincide: 
8 Goal substitution occurs when role occupants, especially 
implementing agents, substitute their own personal goals -- like 
accepting a bribe or appointing unqualified relatives -- for the 
aims intended by the law. 
(i) Their environment provides them the opportunity to choose 
to obey or disobey. For example, a bantustan authority 
has many opportunities to embezzle other people's money; 
a poor rural resident very few. 
(ii) They have the capacity to obey, that is, they possess the 
skills and resources to perform the task the law 
prescribes. In several African countries, for example, 
colonial authorities passed laws requiring peasants to 
grow cash crops. Without inputs or credit to buy them, 
without knowledge of how to plant and tend them, without 
roads to the market, many could not act as prescribed. 
(iii) The rule must be communicated to the role-occupants. 
For example, if peasants in colonial Tanganyika did not 
know that the law required them to grow cash crops, they 
could obey it only accidentally. Researchers should ask: 
(1) Does the law's wording adequately communicate the 
law-makers' intention? (Rubin 1989:408 et seq.; Thornton 
1987; Driedger 1983; Allott 1980: 36-37; Ilbert 1914; 
Thring 1902); and (2) does the way law-makers publicize 
the law ensure its addressees know of their intention? 
(Seidman, R. B. 1972:680; Gifford 1970:409; Robertson & 
Teitlebaum 1973:665, 695ff). 
( c) . Interest . Law and economics had it at least partly 
plainly do influence behavior. right: Material incentives 
Researchers obviously must investigate the incentives and 
disincentives thrown up by the role occupants' environment. That 
includes the threatened pains and penalties, or the rewards offered 
by the law itself. Role-occupants consider, however, not the law-
in-the-books, but the likelihood that implementing authorities will 
enforce them. (Rural South Africans sometimes disobeyed apartheid 
pass laws in hopes that no policeman would catch them.) The 
authorities' 
implementing 
implementing 
own perceived interest may 
behavior. If public officials 
agency rules prohibiting 
influence their 
see that strictly 
large industrial 
organizations from polluting will prejudice their post-retirement 
job opportunities, they may conclude that their interest lies in 
enforcing the rules laxly or not at all (Arnold 1981:853; Bernstein 
1955; cf. Jaffe 1956:1068) 
d. Process. Whether role-occupants, as individuals or in 
collectivities, obey a law depends in part upon the process by 
which they reach their decision. For example, if an agency 
managing national parks conducts secret negotiations with 
commercial enterprises, it will likely make different decisions 
than if it holds public hearings at which environment-protection 
groups testify. 
Process measures the extent that the state and the legal order 
foster democratic community participation: Whose problems law 
makers and implementers address; what and whose evidence they 
consider; and the impact of possible measures introduced on various 
interest groups (including different gender and employment and 
income groupings). If the state's decision-making process takes 
place in secret, and only permits the rich and powerful to supply 
inputs, new rules will almost inevitably reinforce their status. 
Only changing the decision-making processes to ensure transparency 
and participation by the poor and disinherited will likely ensure 
that the legal order meets their needs. 
e. Subjective factors ('ideology'). Like law and economics, 
the sociologists and their jurisprudential analogues had it partly 
right: Obviously, people's world views do influence their actions 
(Friedman, 1969). First, social sentiments commonly sway role 
occupants' choices. Throughout the third world, especially in 
rural areas, for example, traditional values and attitudes 
frequently excluce women from decision-making processes. Second, 
and more pervasively, actors' actions acquire meaning only in the 
context of their own subjective understandings, what Gouldner 
(1970) called their 'domain assumptions' (Schutz 1965:60, 62; Weber 
1949:32ff; Parsons 1949:26). Researchers can only explain why one 
person gives another some thin metal discs if they know how the 
actors perceive the discs: Perhaps as medals, and the recipient as 
a craftsman who will polish them; as religious objects, and the 
recipient as a priest or shaman; or as money, and the recipient as 
a tradesman receiving them as payment (Kronman 1990:1051; Weber 
1968:7; Winch 1958:117). To explain role occupants' behavior, 
researchers must comprehend, their commonly-held beliefs and the 
socially-acquired and transmitted norms. (Ellickson 1986; Moore & 
Anderson 1965:72). 
The mnemonic, ROCCIPI, helps to remember the seven 
categories that comprise this more specific research agenda: 
Rule, Qpportunity, Capacity, Communication, Interest, Process and 
Xdeology. Together, broadly construed, these categories seem to 
encompass all the factors likely to influence the effect of a law 
on the behavior of any particular role-occupant. In considering 
each category, 9 researchers should critically assess all the 
middle-level propositions suggested by alternative theoretical 
perspectives, and incorporate the most fruitful into their 
explanatory hypotheses -- their maps for investigating the facts in 
particular cases. 
Once warranted by the evidence (or, more likely, revised in 
light of evidence systematically gathered to try to falsify them), 
the explanations researchers generate lead logically to proposed 
changes in laws and institutions likely to induce more desireable 
behavior. 
D. THE THEORY AND METHODOLOGY, SUMMARIZED 
No magic wand can provide a 'quick fix' to change the 
institutions that condemn four-fifths of the South African 
population to poverty and powerlessness. Evidence from throughout 
the third world proves that neither simply changing the faces of 
those at the top, however done, nor copying laws from 'successful' 
countries will likely lead to effective rural development. Like 
all institutions, those imposed by the apartheid regime comprise 
repetitive patterns of behavior that the new democratic state can 
change only through the legal order. For the democratic movement 
of South African to transform sound rural policies into appropriate 
legislation requires adoption of a participatory problem-solving 
methodology to empower rural South Africans to use the legal order 
9 Sometimes, consideration of explanations in one or more 
category may seem superfluous. For example, law-makers usually 
communicate relevant rules and their contents to key .a:re 
Q.Ce\olpant$, officials~ in government implementing agencies. 
build new institutions based on reason informed by experience. 
The problem-solving approach generates middle level 
explanatory propositions sufficiently specific to ground time-and-
place specific policy, and facilitates constant checking and 
reformulating those middle-level explanations and specific 
proposals for solution in light of evidence. It has a deeply 
democratic thrust: By participating in the process of assessing 
candidate explanations and the consequences of solutions based on 
them against evidence drawn from their own life experience, the 
people affected may learn what 'works' and what does not, which 
middle propositions produce good policies and which do not, and 
even which methodologies, grand theories and categories prove 
useful as guides and which do not. Only that kind of learning 
process can empower rural dwellers to design and implement 
increasingly effective measures to improve the conditions of their 
own lives. 
To explain the dysfunctions of particular institutions 
'-E'. '/ • : ,. ' 
requires~ of the social behaviors of the central 
role occupants who shape the allocation of relevant resources and 
make critical political decisions. The ROCCIPI mnemonic lists a 
set of categories useful in generating possible explanations for 
that dysfunctional behavior. The relevant explanations, consistent 
with available evidence, lay a sound foundation for overcoming 
poverty and oppression by creating institutions designed to 
facilitate democratic participation and cooperation, and through 
reason informed by experience. 
III. The central difficulty confronting rural development in South 
Africa: The poverty and oppression of the rural poor. 
To propose draft bills directed at changing the relevant rural 
institutions, the workshop participants first identified the 
central role occupants and the aspects of their behavior that 
comprised the difficulty. As the primary role occupants, they 
focused on the difficulties confronting the rural poor. These did 
not comprise a simple, homogeneous mass. Over the decades, 
apartheid institutions had coerced them into several interrelated 
impoverished groups: migratory laborers who worked on the 
commercial farms, mines, and so-called 'modern' industries; women, 
children and older men who struggled to survive in the bantustans 
with inadequate land and outmoded tools; and the growing numbers of 
un- and under-employed men and women, pushed back into impoverished 
peri-urban areas by the introduction of modern labor-saving 
technologies in all sectors of 'modern' agriculture, mining, and 
industry -- now totalling almost half the rural population. 
Drawing on their existing knowledge and experience, the 
workshop participants first used the ROCCIPI agenda to suggest 
tentative explanations of these primary role occupants' behavior 
that comprised the difficulties their proposed draft legislation 
should aim to resolve. Obviously, their initial explanations would 
require further investigation to ensure they exposed all the causes 
of rural poverty. Essentially, however, grounded in the extensive 
collective experience of the workshop participants, they provided 
an initial basis for proposing the kinds of solutions the proposed 
legislation would probably need to incorporate. In that sense, 
they suggested the outlines of broad legislative programmes 
required to overcome rural poverty. 
The limited space here available permits only an outline of 
the workshop participanfs' initial tentative explanations of the 
difficulties confronting the rural poor, sparked off by considering 
the ROCCIPI research agenda. 
Rules: Apartheid institutions cage every aspect of the work 
and lives of South Africa's rural poor. Those institutions deny 
rural folk access to adequate well-watered fertile land, and the 
machinery and equipment needed to develop the little land they 
have. They prevent them from acquiring the skills required to 
manufacture tools for farming, processing and storage of produce, 
and the basic consumer necessities required for a minimum standard 
of living. They prevent them from acquiring credit to buy 
necessary productive tools and equipment. They hamper them from 
selling what little surplus they do produce, whether in the form of 
farm products, handicrafts, or simple manufactures. Workshop 
participants pointed out, for example, that even when an NGO helped 
a group of women to grow a few vegetables or to sew dresses, local 
officials often enforced local regulations to block their efforts 
to sell them. 
All these explanations pointed to the necessity for a 
fundamental alteration of the way the legal order supported 
oligopolistic 'modern' industries and commercial farms' domination 
of resources, including land and essential inputs, research and 
extension education, markets, and credit. Only by using law to 
restructure the existing institutions, embedded in the existing 
legal order, could the law empower South Africa's rural majority to 
improve the circumstances that determined their working and living 
conditions. 
Opportuni-ty and capacity: The workshop participants pointed 
out that the existing property, marketing, and credit institutions, 
embedded in the legal order, block the rural population's 
opportunity to acquire the inputs and markets necessary to enable 
them to create their own productive employment and increased 
incomes. Bantu educational institutions explicitly aim to thwart 
their efforts to learn the skills and build the capacity to utilize 
even the limited resources available to them. As a result, those 
rural folk who cannot obtain wage employment at low wages on 
commercial farms, mines or in urban industries end up depending on 
the incomes of those family members who can, or struggling in 
competition with each other to make and sell produce in the 
'informal' sector (read often 'illegal' because not licensed under 
existing law). Women in peri-urban areas, in particular, have 
little opportunity to earn cash incomes for their families except 
by setting up 'illegal' shabeens or prostitution. 
Communication: The law makers and implementers rely primarily 
on the institutions of police powers to 'inform' the rural folk of 
the behaviors the existing legal order imposes on them. The 
police, for example, often arrest those who try to sell their 
produce in violation of marketing regulations, forcing them to pay 
fines or go to jail -- wiping out what little income they efforts 
might generate. 
Interest: Enforcement of legal restrictions on their 
opportunities and capacity distorted many rural folk's interests in 
ways that led to counterproductive behaviors, as when migrants 
invest their limited cash savings in livestock, aggravating 
overgrazing in overcrowded bantustan areas; women scour the 
countryside, chopping down for firewood for desparately-needed 
fuel, contributing factors leading to environmental degradation; 
families take children, especially girls, out of school to save 
school fees and help with house chores. 
Process: All governmental institutions for decision-making, 
not only at the nationl, but also the regional and local level, 
exclude the mass of rural poor. Secrecy regulations limit their 
access to information necessary for participation; working rules 
prohibit them from providing inputs into the decision-making 
processes; internal decision-making processes prevent consideration 
of their concerns and needs; and, except through mass 
demonstrations and violent protests, they have almost no avenues 
for feedback as to the impact of relevant decisions on their lives. 
Ideology: The legal order's impact on all aspects of their 
lives and working conditions, together with their relative 
isolation, has fostered attitudes of dependence and a lack of 
confidence among many of the rural poor. The institutions of 
apartheid, coercing men into a migrant labor force, have aggravated 
attitudes and values of male superiority that particularly 
disadvantage women both in the community at large and within the 
remnants of rural family life. 
Tested and deepened in the light of further participatory 
investigations, these tentative explanations already begain to 
suggest the outlines of a legislative programme to empower the 
rural majority to take part in development of a future democratic 
South Africa. 
III. A democratic legislative programme for the rural areas. 
The list of explanations generated by examining the ROCCIPI 
research agenda related to the rural majority as primary role 
occupants led the workshop participants to divide into three groups 
to analyze the three interrelated components of a legislative 
programme for dismantling the apartheid system and empowering the 
rural majority to participate in a democratic process of 
development. 
A. Legislation to give the rural majority access to adequate 
well-watered, fertile land, and provision for decent wages, 
working and living conditions for commercial farm workers. 
(Bob to fill in) 
The first group decided that, in light of the limited time 
available, they would focus on drafting a bill to provide decent 
wages, working and living conditions for commercial farm workers. 
(Bob to fill in) 
B. Legislation to ensure the rural majority acquires the 
skills, access to inputs, credits, and markets to create their 
own avenues for employment and improved quality of life. 
The second group of workshop participants briefly reviewed the 
factors suggested by the ROCCIPI agenda to explain the 
counterproductive decision-making behaviors of central role 
occupants in the central institutions, enshrined in apartheid laws, 
whose behaviors perpetuate the impoverishment and oppression of the 
rural majority. These comprise complex decision-making educational 
---
institutions which, from primary school through university, deny 
the rural majority the knowledge and skills required to participate 
effectively in managing and superivising, as well as providing the 
skilled labor, for modern interrelated industrial and agricultural 
development; the public and private corporations whose investment 
decisions foster the growth of an increasingly capital-intensive 
modern industrial sector (much of it to bolster the military 
machine required to perpetuate the oppressive apartheid system), 
aggravating rural unemployment; and the marketing institutions that 
protect oligopolistically-controlled industry and agriculture by 
explicit discrimination against African entrepreneurs' produce, 
whether foodstuffs, productive equipment, or consumer necessities. 
C. Rural financial institutions as sources of credit for 
rural poor. 
Group Three focused on the way the existing legal order 
maintains financial institutions developed as an integral feature 
of the apartheid system. These remain geared to the accumulation 
and reinvestment of capital primarily in the expansion of the 
dualistic political economy: a so-called 'modern' integrated 
industrial-agricultural enclave that enriched the (white) ruling 
groups; and the neglected, impoverished rural areas that produced 
the low cost labor that made the 'modern' sector so profitable for 
those who controlled it. The predominant financial institutions 
include the Federal Reserve Bank, the commercial banks, insurance 
and pension funds, and the building societies. 
For nearly a century, in the rural area, the state-operated 
Land Bank has financed only large, increasingly mechanized (white) 
commercial farms, subsidizing them through low interest credit and 
repeated debt moratoriums that, in recent years, have totalled 
billions of rands; some 70 percent of the (white) commercial farms 
only continue to exist because the Land Bank does not call in their 
loans. Only in recent years has the apartheid regime established 
new financial institutions, like the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa which -- despite its claims to the contrary -- finances, not 
the poor rural majority, but infrastructural projects that 
primarily benefit the large commercial farms (now including those 
owned or controlled by bantustan authorities) 
Meanwhile, existing legislation and bank practices deny credit 
to the majority of rural (black) farmers and un- or under-employed 
cannot obtain the funds necessary to finance their farms or other 
efforts to enter into entrepreneurial activities. Restructuring 
the existing system of financial institutions constitutes a third 
essential legislative programme area for rural development. 
Their reviews led Groups Two and Three to conclude that a new 
democratic government would have to enact legislation to 
restructure the entire system of interrelated apartheid legislation 
that shaped these institutions. Given the limited time available 
in the workshop, however, they decided to work together to 
formulate an initial draft bill to create an extension education 
agency that would in every way seek to empower the rural majority 
to acquire the knowledge, skills and credit to acquire the 
resources and engage in producing and selling the essentials for 
rural development, from food and clothing, through appropriate 
tools and equipment, to construction and furnishing housing. 
The next section summarizes the draft memoranda of law that 
explains the reasoning behind woikshop participants' initial draft 
bill relating to farm workers, and the creation of an extension 
education agency. 
IV. Rough drafts and accompanying outlines of memoranda of law for 
two priority bills as the basis for further participatory research: 
A. Proposed legislation for protection of farm workers and 
their families; 
(Bob to fill in) 
B. Proposed Extension Agency to empower rural poor to obtain 
productive employment and improved living standards. 
Groups Two and Three drafted an outline of a memorandum of law 
that, incorporating the explanations sparked off by their review of 
the ROCCIPI categories relevant to existing extension educational 
institutions, provides the reasoning that lies behind their draft 
bill proposing an extension education agency to empower the rural 
poor to engage in productive employment and improve their living 
standards. By outlining a draft memorandum of law, they began to 
identify the areas of further research needed to warrant and deepen 
those explanations, ensuring that the proposed agency would help to 
overcome the causes of rural unemployment and impoverishment. 
1. Explanations for the inadequacy of the existing extension 
institutions: 
The two groups reviewed the evidence they had relating to 
explanations suggested by the ROCCIPI research agenda as to the way 
the existing extension educational institutions functioned to 
disempower the black rural majority. 
Rules: The members of the two groups pointed out that the 
existing legal order not only ensured that the apartheid state 
spent far more on general education at all levels for whites, but 
in particular had for many decades provided extensive research, 
extension educational, and financial support to ensure the success 
of white commercial farmers. The limited extension programmes for 
blacks primarily aimed to teach them skills for operating machinery 
on those (white-owned) commercial farms, not for the farm 
administration, marketing and finance necessary for managing the 
commercial farms. Extension programmes established by bantustan 
authorities operated on limited budgets_ and under regulations that 
------------
limited their potential for empowering poor bantustan residents, 
especially women, to enter market production. National and 
bantustan legislation permitted on-government organizations (NGOs) 
to set up programmes to assist black rural residents to acquire 
skills to engage in small-scale farming and informal sector 
projects, but gave them little if any resources for the purpose. 
The Development Bank of Southern Africa, for example, established 
by agreement betwee~ the South African government and the bantustan 
authorities, recently has ciaimed to provide credit to the rural 
poor through NGOs, but the available data suggests that it actually 
allocates little more than one percent of its total credit for that 
purpose; most of its resources assist infrastructural projects that 
only benefit large commercial. farms (including some owned by 
bantustan elites). 
The two groups' participants, however, emphasized the need to 
acquire further detailed information relating to the existing 
legislation discriminated in the provision of skills and resources 
to the commercial farmers and bantustan elites, on the one hand, 
and the impoverished majority of rural residents, on the other. 
That would facilitate identification of specific changes required 
to create an effective democratic extension agency to empower the 
rural poor. 
Opportunity and capacity: The existing national research and /?0-, i,,J-~' 
extension education programmes typically ~) to ensure white a&v--,:r ,7 
"-3 p~ 
11, .' -,J)./j, ,\farmers retain control over the commercial farm sector, and foster 1·•·' .. > 
Q<-~ 
continually expanded investments in the labour-saving technologies 
that have aggravated unemployment among black farm workers. 
Without opportunities to acquire advanced skills, [rural blacks have 
little choice but to work as unskilled or semi-skilled farm labor 1~~ .. •'.~ 
,,yt__.. . [ 0 
or to migrate to live in hostels and work on the mines -- when job j Cl'f'Pfa ) 
+" \ tJ ';K 
opportunities exist] The limited bantustan extension education 0~,.-:1;~) 
. II~-.- ,,,. programmes service the needs of the larger elite-owned bantustan ..,.,, · · ,.-, /-/ ,, J 
farms. Lack of financial and other resources limit NGO programmes :~~t~:Y ~ < 
to particular areas where they reach relatively few rural poor with ¼ 1 
either the skills or resources to engage in 
either of farm or other commodities. Gigid 
production and sale 
licensing and other 
restrictions, as well as lack of information about 
opportunities, hamper those who succeed in producing a surplus fro 
selling it profitably.] 
Communication: White commercial farmers receive regular 
information about the research and extension education services 
available. Bantustan extension educational personnel typically 
inform only larger farm owners of the limited programs they 
l.,r 
provide. Black farm workers may hear of opportunities through 
their employers, but many never even know of the limited 
opportunities that exist. NGOs make more effort to reach the rural 
poor, and some particularly focus on women; but their efforts 
remain limited by their limited resources. 
Interest: National extension education personnel, mostly 
white males, found it in their interest primarily to service white 
commercial farmers. They have the land and capital to make 
profitable use of up-to-date, relatively capital-intensive 
technologies, and can ensure the system rewards extension personnel 
who provide them. The bantustan extension systems likewise offer 
greater rewards to personnel who service the bantustan authorities 
and their cronies. Extension personnel who work for NGOs that 
seek to foster rural development exhibit greater interest in 
reaching the rural poor. 
Process: Black commercial farm workers and other rural 
residents remain excluded from the decision-making processes at all 
levels. Large scale commercial farmers have powerful lobbies that 
influence the Parliament to pass legislation and fund research and 
extension educational programmes to fulfil their requirements. In 
the bantustans, the authorities retain control over their limited 
services. [The DBSA mechanisms exclude the rural poor from 
participating either in decisions as to what projects should 
receive credit or in providing feedback as to the impact of those 
funded] Al though NGOs often proclaim their aim to encourage 
participation of rural personnel in their decision-structures, some 
are more successful than others. Some, funded from abroad, tend to 
respond more readily to directives from their overseas donors than 
to foster rural residents' efforts to achieve self-reliance. 
Ideology: The extension education training programmes have 
for decades inculcated extension education personnel with attitudes 
that assume only whites (and occasion rich, well-connected blacks) 
can take advantage of their services. Too often, they assume black 
rural workers and small farm owners remain ignorant, unwilling to 
risk investments in new technologies. Moreover, the typically male 
bantustan extension educational personnel neglect female farmers 
who do a major share of most small-scale bantustan food farming. 
While NGOs often proclaim their desire to give rural poor, 
especially women, greater opportunities,\ they sometimes find it,,. !)t;,~_-a·A 
L <'/ 
necessary to educate their own agents to reject ~idea~) as 
well as to combat the feelings of inferiority and lack of self-
confidence imposed on the rural poor by decades of apartheid. 
2. Reasons for the proposals incorporated in the draft bill 
to create a new Extension Agency: 
Their. review of the existing institutions relating to rural 
~t-t' : i ' 
re~earch, exte~sion education, and finance led the group to claia-fL 
)---"1! .)4.,lh:: f-1..,(,./,,.• ,  ,: ,., 
a ki:t1 pr@FO~ a new democratically structured Extension Agency 
which in every respect would seek to empower the poor rural 
majority to engage in productive employment activities and market 
their produce. It would particularly focus on assisting rural un-
and under-employed, especially women. 
The new government would appoint an Administration composed of 
the heads of~five departments. A governing board would 
include representatives appointed by the elected authorities of the 
regions. 
The Agency will consist of five departments: A research 
department; an education and training department; an extension 
department; a finance department; and a monitoring and supervisory 
department. 
The criteria and procedures determining the functions of these 
five departments will require that each creates input, conversion 
and feedback processes that involve the participation of the rural 
poor as fully as possible in every aspect, providing transparency 
and accountability at every point. At the end of the first year, 
each department will report to the newly-elected regional 
authorities and the newly-elected Parliament as to its progress in 
making appropriate institutional linkages and developing its 
programme in ways calculated to meet the production needs of the 
rural majority. 
The Planning and Research Department. The Planning and 
Research Department will focus on identifying appropriate 
technologies 
necessities, 
for rural production 
and the institutional 
of farm inputs and consumer 
changes required to ensure 
adequate markets, processing ,and transport for commodities produced 
by small-scale (including cooperative) rural enterprises. It will 
identify and allocate adequate resources to improve the work of 
existing research institutions, including those in universities and 
separate institutes. Together with the Training Department and the 
Extension Department, it will coordinate the development of an 
appropriately integrated research, training and extension education 
programme. 
Training Department: The Training Department will undertake 
two types of training programmes. First, it will identify existing 
training institutions, including universities and secondary schools 
in every region, to coordinate and develop short term training 
programmes for the rural poor. The department will provide 
financial resources to appropriate institutions to give them an 
incentive and the funds to introduce creative new training 
programmes to provide the rural poor with adequate knowledge and 
skills to engage in productive activities and market their output, 
as well as to participate in restructuring rural institutions to 
meet their own needs. 
Second, the Training Department will identify institutions to 
undertake a one year programme to train a core of extension 
, J,'fll 
education agent'fwork through the Extension Education Department to 
assist the poor rural majority to engage in productive activities. 
Extension Education Department: The Extension Education 
Department will employ extension agents who will work with the 
rural poor either on a part-time and full-time basis to assist them 
in acquiring the knowledge, skills, and physical and financial 
resources to engage in productive projects and establish the 
processing, storage and transport facilities essential to market 
their output. Because of the difficulties of working with many 
individual small producers, the Extension Education Department 
agents will encourage the rural residents to form appropriate forms 
of voluntary cooperatives to facilitate provision of resources and 
skills. Drawing on the evidence provided by extension agents and 
together with the Research Departmen~, this Department will also 
make recommendations to the national and regional elected 
legislatures for new measures to improve the marketing institutions 
and create adequate linkages between industrial and rural 
development. 
Finance Department: The Finance Department will have three 
functions: First, it will manage a revolving credit fund which, on 
the advice of appropriate extension agents, will make initial 
allocations of credit to small-scale farmers, rural entrepreneurs, 
and cooperatives, at low rates of interest. Second, it will work 
with financial institutions, including the DBSA, the SBCD (?), 
commercial banks, insurance and pension funds, to guarantee larger 
allocations of credit for successful on-going productive rural 
projects. Third, it will make recommendations for legislation to 
improve the contribution of national and regional financial 
institutions to rural development. 
Supervisory and Monitoring Department: The Supervisory and 
Monitoring Department will have two primary functions: First, it 
will create mechanisms to ensure that all Agency departments carry 
out their mandate of creating appropriate rules and regulations to 
empower the rural poor, especially the un- and underemployed and 
women, to participate in all aspects of the development of their 
programmes . Second, any Agency employee or any rural resident 
engaged in any aspect of the Agency programme may appeal to an 
internal tribunal in this Department regarding the decisions of any 
relevant Agency department. The tribunal's decision shall be 
subject to review by an appeals court, not de novo, but only on 
procedures. 
3. On-going research: 
Many details of the draft Agency bill and the accompanying 
memorandum of law require further research along several lines. 
First, more detailed analysis of the laws that underpin the 
existing relevant institutions will facilitate analysis of the 
changes required to enable the Agency to undertake its task. 
Second, democratic movement researchers should gather and 
critically review all the available relevant documents produced by 
government, universities, and NGOs. Third, rural community members 
should be encouraged to participate in assessing the evidence they 
have as to the nature of difficulties they confront, the kinds of 
explanations they might generate for the behaviors of institutional 
role occupants, and the range of possible solutions they might 
propose. Fourth, a careful social cost-benefit analysis of the 
proposed bill requires a great deal of evidence as to relative 
costs to the new government (compared to other possible ways of 
tackling the causes of rural unemployment and poverty); what groups 
would likely experience negative consequences; and the extent of 
the probable benefits to the rural poor. 
These initial drafts, both of the memoranda of law and the 
proposed bills, then, comprise only a first step in an on-going 
process of transforming South Africa's democratic movement's policy 
proposals into draft legislation. The workshop participants 
proposed several follow-up measures as the next steps in that 
process. 
V. Follow-up proposals: 
